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THE JONES ACT:
IT IS TIME FOR REFORM
Richard L. Clarke
Clemson University

The Jones Act was passed in 1920 as an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act. Its initial purpose
was to protect a rail monopoly operating between the state of Washington and the territory of Alaska.
It restricted transportation between U.S. ports to U.S. built, owned, registered and crewed vessels.
Over the past 77 years it has become very controversial. This paper examines its costs and benefits
and concludes that the Jones Act is indeed in need of major reform.
INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Jones Act of 1920 set aside domestic trade
for US-built, US-flagged and U.S. crewed ships.
The primary purpose of the Jones Act was to
ensure the United States would have an
adequate merchant marine fleet available
during national emergencies. Over the past 77
years there have been many significant changes
affecting U.S. defense sealift needs and
capabilities.

According to Wood and Johnson (1996) cabotage
is a set of laws which restrict commerce between
a nation’s port to carriers of that nation. It is
one of the primary ways in which a nation can
protect domestic transportation industries.

Today, there is serious debate in Washington as
well as several state capitals regarding the
current benefits and costs of the Jones Act. The
two primary debate topics focus on the increased
costs of goods in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and
Puerto Rico and the current national defense
benefits of the Jones Act. The purpose of this
paper is to examine these two primary issues to
determine if it is time to reform or eliminate the
Jones Act. To address this central question the
paper reviews the background of the Jones Act,
then analyses the impact the Jones Act has had
on military sealift capability and finally
examines the economic effects of the Jones Act.

Cabotage was officially established in the United
States under the Jones Act of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920. Its beginning, however, can
be traced back to the eighteenth century.
In the late 1700's, the government of the United
States began protecting US coastal trade
indirectly. Acts passed in 1789 and 1790 levied
discriminatory duties and port tonnage taxes on
foreign-built ships engaged in U.S. coastal
trades. In 1817, these acts were replaced by
legislation that preserved US coastal shipping
for domestically-flagged ships only. As new
trade routes were developed to U.S. possessions
and territories such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii,
Alaska, and the Philippines, they were included
under this rule. During World War II, U.S.
cabotage restrictions were temporarily lifted as
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the merchant marine became fully engaged in
wartime missions.
The major piece of legislation that formally
stated the U.S. position on coastal trade
protection was the Jones Act of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920. It stated in part:
That no merchandise shall be
transported by water, or by land
and water on penalty of
forfeiture thereof, between points
in the United States, included
Districts, Territories, and
possessions thereof embraced
within the coastwise laws, either
directly or via a foreign port, or
for any part of the transportation,
in any other vessel than a vessel
built in and documented under
the laws of the United States
(Whitehurst, 1985).
Over the years, there have been some exceptions
to the Jones Act. The Philippines and the Virgin
Islands were both given exemptions. This
became irrelevant for the Phillippines when they
gained independence in 1946. However, the
Virgin Islands exemption still stands today. The
original exemptions allowed goods to be
transported by foreign-flagged ships if that was
necessary to ensure adequate shipping service.
In 1936, an amendment to the Jones Act was
passed which granted the U.S. Virgin Islands
complete exemption from U.S. cabotage laws
unless decided otherwise by the President of the
United States.
Section 27 of the Jones Act provides for other
exemptions. The primary one is that, “vessels of
foreign registry may transport between US ports
empty cargo vans, shipping tanks, or barges
designed for carriage aboard ship and associated
equipment used in the vessel’s foreign trade”
(Whitehurst, 1985). Section 27 also provides for
the transfer of goods from one non-self-propelled
barge to another, in the contiguous states. In
addition, ships built with construction
differential subsidies are not allowed to compete
in the coastal trades. Occasionally, waivers
12
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have been granted when no Jones Act ship was
available. These waivers have almost entirely
been for the transport of crude oil from Alaska to
the lower forty-eight states.
Although some argue that the Jones Act has
been effective and continues to be necessary for
our national defense, not everyone agrees. A
coalition for Jones Act Reform has been formed
in Washington, DC. This reform group proposes
significant changes to this long-standing law.
The next section reviews the impact of the Jones
Act on American labor, ships, and shipbuilding
relative to defense needs and economic
soundness.
LABOR
Over the years, the protection provided by the
Jones Act and earlier laws allowed the wages of
the American sailors to rise much more rapidly
than those of foreign crews. The effect of these
high labor costs on jobs is one area under fire in
the debate over Jones Act reform.
The Jones Act, according to industry analyst
Alan Abrams, has helped save jobs for American
workers in the shipping industry (1991). In
1983, there were approximately 160,000
workers in private US shipyards. Of those,
10,000 workers could directly attribute their
jobs to the protectionism provided by the Jones
Act. Unfortunately, the jobs saved by the Jones
Act may have cost others their jobs in the U.S.
shipping industry. By the end of 1995 more
than 60 US shipyards had been shut down
eliminating an estimated 200,000 U.S. jobs. In
addition, 40,000 merchant marines and 40,000
U.S. longshoremen have lost their jobs, despite
Jones Act “protection” (Collins, 1996). Today,
there is a notable lack of US-flag, US-crewed
vessels engaged in carrying U.S. trade. A large
part of this is due to the enormous discrepancies
in wages and working conditions between US
ships and foreign-flag vessels registered in
countries with fewer regulations. Vessels form
countries like Bangladesh, the Philippines, and
Eastern Europe have comparatively lower crew
costs because they pay much lower wages and
few, if any, benefits. A 1983 study conducted by

the U.S. Congressional Budget Office found that
U.S. crew costs were on average, 2.5 times
higher than those of European crews and over
six times higher than those of Third World
Countries (Whitehurst, 1985).
Primarily
because of these very high crew costs, U.S. ship
owners have increasingly registered their ships
in so called flag of convenience nations like
Panama, Liberia, Honduras and the Marshall
Islands so they can use much cheaper foreign
crews. In addition, the U.S. International Trade
Commission recently concluded that the Jones
Act has cost thousands of jobs across
agriculture, metals, forestry, manufacturing and
petroleum sectors of the U.S. economy (Collins,
1996).
In testimony to the House subcommittee on
Transportation and Infrastructure in June 1996,
the President of the U.S. Steel Manufacturers
Association, James Collins, argued for reform of
the Jones Act. According to his testimony, the
Jones Act restrictions are putting U.S. steel
makers at a distinct disadvantage with respect
to their foreign competitors who are free to use
the full range of transportation options.
Included in his testimony are the following
specific examples:
♦

it’s more expensive to ship scrap metal from
the Port of New York-New Jersey (NYNJ) to
the U.S. Gulf Coast than it is to ship it from
NY-NJ to any Asian port.

♦

Venezuela has become the leading supplier
of steel products in Puerto Rico because of
the excessively high cost of shipping steel
under the Jones Act.

♦

Some U.S. steel producers can not ship to
potential domestics markets at any price
because the Jones Act ships are not available
(1996).

That it is necessary for the national
defense and for the proper growth of its
foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant
marine of the best equipped and most
suitable types of vessels sufficient to
carry the greater portion of its commerce
and serve as a naval or military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency,
ultimately to be owned and operated by
citizens of the United States
(Whitehurst, 1985)
The question that has been raised is whether or
not the Jones Act has been effective in its goal of
sustaining such a fleet.
Long-time maritime journalist Robert Quartel
claims the Jones Act is actually responsible for
driving most U.S. ships out of business.
Although the U.S. has an extensive system of
deep water and inland ports, it has almost no
ships. While not a single coastal freighter
operates on its nearly 2,000 mile-long EastCoast, thousands of coastal freighters ply the
waters of Europe and the Pacific Rim (Quartel,
1991). In 1830, American vessels carried 90
percent of the nations’s trade; by 1980, they
carried less than 10 percent and this number
continues to decrease (Whitehurst, 1985). After
World War II, there were approximately 2,500
privately owned vessels of more than 100 tons
displacement. According to the trade journal
Feedstuff's, currently there are only 128 and of
those, only 33 carry dry bulk cargo (1995). The
rest are liquid carriers. There are no US-flag
bulkers at all operating on the Great Lakes.
The number of US-flag ships are declining and
the military usefulness of the ones that remain
are questionable.
In 1984, the Jones Act fleet included 198 active
merchant vessels.
However, according to
Whitehurst, a senior transportation research
fellow at the Strom Thurmond Institute,

SHIPS
The preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of
1920 states in part:

In 1985 the US-flag merchant marine
was only marginally capable of
supporting US forces in Europe if war
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should come to that continent and could
not simultaneously support a NATO
effort and one or more contingencies in
other parts of the world (1985).
This was evidenced in the Persian Gulf War in
1991 where only 10 percent of the ships
specifically subsidized for the national defense
actually entered the war zone (Shorrock, 1993).
In fact, the Jones Act had to be temporarily
suspended during the Persian Gulf war because
it was impeding the transportation of fuel
products to the Gulf.
SHIPBUILDING
The preamble to the Merchant Marine Act of
1920 also states that it is the policy of the
United States to do whatever may be necessary
to develop and ensure the maintenance of'
citizen-owned and operated merchant marine.
It is debatable whether the Jones Act has
achieved its goal of being able to maintain this
fleet and if this objective is being pursued in the
most effective manner.
In the past, Jones Act ships have been
responsible for keeping a number of U.S.
shipyards from going out of business (Feedstuffs,
1995). In the 30 years from 1953 to 1983, over
300 vessels were constructed for the Jones Act
trades (Whitehurst, 1985). From 1970 through
1985, Jones Act ships accounted for 100% of the
commercial ships built in American shipyards.
This represents a notable investment in
American shipping. The major justification for
the extensive federal investment in U.S.
shipyards has been to provide the construction
and maintenance capability necessary to build,
modify and maintain both naval warships and
U.S. flag cargo ships. There’s little doubt this
capability is essential to the foreign policy of the
U.S. In 1984 and 1985, this investment totaled
almost one billion dollars (Whitehurst, 1985). In
the past, the Jones Act had a significant
influence on keeping American shipyards alive
and able to serve national defense needs.
Military shipbuilding alone could not have
accomplished this. However, as pointed out in
the previous section, the Jones Act has not been
14
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effective at stopping the significant decline in
U.S. shipyard jobs or U.S. merchant seamen
jobs. More recently, the Maritime Security Act
of 1996 has eliminated an old requirement
(dating from 1936) that ships receiving
operating subsidies must be US-built.
While it is clear that shipyards must be
maintained for the national defense, how many
shipyards are actually needed and whether a
sufficient defense base could be maintained
without the Jones Act are questions now being
debated. While Section 27 of the Jones Act
granted a monopoly to the shipyards on
construction of ships for domestic trade, it left
construction for the international trade open to
foreign competition. Since the cost of building a
merchant ship in the U.S. is about three times
that of building in Japan or Korea, domestic
construction for foreign-trade merchant fleets
has been virtually non-existent for the past 30
years. However, the Alabama Shipyard (a
subsidiary of Atlantic Marine Corporation)
recently announced it will build four 1,432-TEU
container ships in the U.S. for the China Ocean
Shipping Co. It should be noted this exception
was based on a 1994 rule change making Title
XI loan guarantees from the U.S. Marine
Administration available to non-U.S. companies
(COSCO, 1997). Title XI of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1936 established governmentbacked loans to encourage U.S. companies to
build their ships in U.S. shipyards just prior to
the outbreak of WWII. This provision while
initially very effective has not stimulated ship
operators to build foreign-trade ships in U.S.
shipyards for several years.
According to a report in the March issue of the
American Shipper (1997), this $157 million deal
was financed by a $138 million Title XI loan
guarantee backed by the U.S. government.
Whether this signals a long-term commitment to
promote U.S. shipyards or a one-time political
decision remains to be seen. The question
remains then, if U.S. shipyards are unable to
compete on the international market, are we
taking the most effective or efficient route to
maintaining our shipyards for national defense?

THE COST OF THE JONES ACT TO
AMERICAN CONSUMERS
The US Built Requirement
Since 1920, the Jones Act has greatly affected
millions of American consumers and hundreds
of American businesses.
In 1990, the
International Trade Commission studied the
costs of the Jones Act to American consumers
and found that the Act costs consumers an
additional $10.4 billion per year (Quartel, 1991).
This cost estimate is derived from the high
prices that must be paid to transport goods on
U.S. ships relative to the average prices paid for
foreign-flag shipping. The Jones Act requires
that the ships used in domestic trade be crewed
by US citizens and be built in US shipyards.
Many feel that the Jones Act is a barrier to
competition and that U.S. Flag domestic carriers
pay too much for vessels,
because they must operate in a restricted
market with restricted resale capacity.
Today, the U.S. is 26th in the world in
merchant shipbuilding, with a mere 0.2%
of the world’s gross tonnage. Between
1980 and 1987, despite the Jones Act’s so
called protection, 60 US shipyards closed!
The last order for a major Jones Act
vessel was in 1987 for the R.J. Pfeiffer,
built for Matson Navigation. The ship
was estimated to cost over $150 million,
or nearly 2.5 times the world price. (The
Jones Act, 1996).
Supporter’s Views
There are some people who feel very differently
about the Jones Act. An article entitled,
“Dismantle the Jones Act”, by Joey Farrell
(1991), President of American Waterway
Operators, argues that the Jones Act provides
the U.S. with working shipyards and crews to
man their ships. The author believes the Jones
Act’s survival is crucial to the survival of the
U.S. economy. However, Farrell overlooks the
cost issue and says that U.S. shipyard jobs are
more important than the high consumer prices.
He is not the only supporter of the Jones Act.

The maritime unions that man the ships and
supply labor to the shipyards are also strong
supporters of the act. Farrell feels that The
Jones Act is the only U.S. maritime promotional
statute that has worked. He feels that if we
didn’t have the Act we would have foreign
vessels crewed by foreign nationals taking over
the domestic trade of the United States.
However, opponents to the Act have proposed
reforms that would help to preserve U.S. jobs
and shipyards.
National Defense
Following the Persian Gulf War, the Clinton
Administration studied the effectiveness of the
Jones Act in providing ships for national
defense.
A commission headed by VicePresident Gore found that only 10% of the USflag ships “specifically subsidized for the
purposes of national defense” entered the war
zone during the Persian Gulf war (Shorrock,
1995). Quartel maintains that only one Jones
Act ship was part of the Persian Gulf
deployment, and it was a roll-on, roll-off vessel.
He and many other respected maritime
observers believe that the Jones Act fleet was
simply not of the right type for use in the rapid
sealift deployment required in Operation Desert
Storm (Quartel, 1991). It seems clear that the
main objective of the Jones Act is not being
achieved. This certainly supports the view that
the Jones Act is outdated and should be
reformed.
Alaska and Hawaii
Alaska’s and Hawaii’s consumers must bear
significantly higher costs for goods than their
mainland counterparts as a result of the Jones
Act.
Studies have estimated the cost of the
Jones Act to Alaskans to range from
$269 million to as high as $674 million
per year. This equates to an annual
penalty on every Alaskan household of
between $1921 and $4821 (The Jones
Act, 1996).
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These are very high costs that captive
consumers must bear. Alaska and Hawaii have
been fighting the Jones Act reform battle for
years by trying to get a waiver to the Jones Act.
The costs imposed on consumers in Alaska may
be even higher than the above figures show.
The Governor of Alaska reported that
independent consultants have estimated the
costs to Alaskans imposed by the Act to be as
high as $800 million annually. It is evident
that Alaska and Hawaii must pay higher costs
because of the Jones Act. There is little doubt
that consumer goods of all kinds would be
cheaper in these states if shippers were free to
use foreign-flag as well as US-flag vessels. This
reason has led supporters of the Jones Act
reform to form a special interest group called the
Jones Act Reform coalition.
THE JONES ACT REFORM COALITION
AND THE COASTAL SHIPPING
COMPETITION ACT
The Jones Act Reform Coalition, according to its
Internet web site (www.lexitech.com/jarc), is an
860,000 member group of diverse private and
public sector organizations. These organizations
include chemical fertilizer and steel
manufacturers, agriculture, livestock, and
forestry companies, ports, independent vessel
owners and operators as well as consumer and
other advocacy groups. The president is the
former maritime journalist, Robert Quartel.
The Coalition, founded in 1995, has been
successful in lobbying Congress to introduce
Jones Act reform legislation. The Bill, known as
the Coastal Shipping Competition Act, would
remove (among other things) the Jones Act
restriction that U.S. deepwater domestic
shipping (U.S. domestic coastal trade would be
redefined to include all waters accessible by
ocean-going vessels, including the Great Lakes
and the St. Lawrence Seaway) be limited to
U.S.-built, owned, flagged and crewed vessels
(Martell, 1997).
Passage of this bill would significantly change
the regulatory controls enacted 77 years ago and
undoubtedly change the transportation industry.
16
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It’s difficult to say what specific changes might
occur, but there’s a strong chance U.S. coastal
shipping would reemerge as a transportation
industry segment and a competitor of rail
transportation.
The Jones Act Reform Coalition predicts that
this new legislation would improve U.S. national
security by increasing the number of vessels and
deepwater-qualified seamen available to the
Department of Defense in time of national
emergencies.
The bill is currently being
discussed in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, it appears that
the Jones Act has outlived its purpose. It’s
contribution to military sealift is now minimal
and it artificially inflates the cost of goods for
millions of American consumers. The 77-yearold law protects very few U.S. flag carriers from
foreign-flag competition while distorting
domestic waterborne transportation markets. It
has also undermined the world-wide
competitiveness of some important U.S.
industries, most notably the steel industry. In
short, the overall negative impact the Jones Act
continues to make on the U.S. economy appears
to be much greater than the small benefits it
may still provide. It is time to reform the Jones
Act as Congress is currently considering.
For years, the U.S. Steel Manufacturers
Association, Alaska, Hawaii, the Jones Act
Reform Coalition, and many independent
organizations have been fighting to gain enough
support to reform the Act. There have been
many concrete reform proposals. The proposed
Coastal Shipping Competition Act would
eliminate the U.S. ownership requirements in
exchange for a requirement that foreign-flag
ships conform with U.S. environmental
regulations, immigration laws, and work force
health and safety regulations. The Bill also
would require foreign-flagged ships to be
registered as U.S. corporations, and pay U.S.
taxes.

Supporters of the reform movement claim with
reform would come more jobs for American
merchant seamen because the amount of
intracoastal shipping would increase if cheaper
foreign-built ships were permitted to compete.
They believe ships would start competing with
trucking and rail and this would in turn reduce
shipment costs and bolster the U.S. sealift
mobility base. This assessment is based on a
reform bill provision which requires domestic
trade ships to be manned by Americans or green
card holders. Of course, not everyone agrees
with this scenario.
Several key congressmen, including Senate
majority leader Lott, and Admiral Herberger,
chief of the U.S. Maritime Administration,

believe U.S. national defense would be
weakened if the Jones Act were reformed. While
they don’t dispute the view that shipment costs
would decrease, Senator Lott and Admiral
Herberger believe U.S. seafaring jobs would be
lost to foreign-flag shipping.
The debate now being waged in Congress seems
to focus on the issue of the value of the Jones
Act to U.S. national defense. While it is
understandable that military officials would
rather have complete control of all resources
that might be needed in a national emergency,
the facts suggest there is a more cost effective
way to accomplish this purpose. It is time to
reform the Jones Act by enacting the Coastal
Shipping Competition Bill.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The author wishes to thank two former students, Shari Ganahl and Ashley Walcher for their
assistance in the research for this paper.
REFERENCES
Abrams, Alan, “Carriers Under Attack,” Journal of
Commerce and Commercial, 19 August 1991,
Section B, p. 7.

Shorrock, Tim, “Jones Act Must be Preserved,
Unions Told,” Journal of Commerce, 4 October
1993, Section A, p. 1.

Collins, James F., “Fair Competition in Shipping,”

Shorrock, Tim, “Ship Sector Would Unite to Defend
Jones Act Industry Officials Say,” Journal of
Commerce, 17 April 1995, Section B, p. 1.

Testimony to U.S. House of Representatives transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee,
Washington, DC, June 1996.
“COSCO to Build Ships in U.S. ''American Shipper.
March 1997, p. 14.

‘The Jones Act’s Pervasive and Damaging Impact on
American Industry,” www/exitech.com/jarc/
index.html.

Farrell, Joe, “Don’t Dismantle Jones Act,” Journal of
Commerce and Commercial, 4 October 1991,
Section A, p. 1.

Vail, Bruce, “Waiver of U.S. Jones Act Likely for
Sulfur Trade,” Journal of Commerce, 17 June
1991, Section B, p. 8.

“Jones Act Costly Failure at Keeping U.S. Fleet,”
Feedstuffs, 15 May 1995, p. 5.

Whitehurst,

Martell, Liz, “Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.)
Introduces Jones Act Reform Legislation,” Jones
Act Reform Coalition Press Release, Washington,
D.C., May 23, 1996.

Clinton H., American Domestic
Shipping in American Ships: Jones Act Costs
Benefits and Options, Washington, DC,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Pohcy
Research, 1985.

Quartel, Robert, ‘The Jones Act? Gimme a Break,”
Journal of Commerce, 8 October 1991, Section A,
p. 1.

Spring 1997

17

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY
Richard L. Clarke (Ph.D., The University of Texas) is an associate professor of transportation &
logistics at Clemson University. Dr. Clarke, a former USAF transportation officer, has published
previously in the Journal of Transportation Management as well as the Transportation Journal, the
Journal of Business Logistics, the Transportation Quarterly, the Defense Transportation Journal,
Decision Sciences, the European Journal of Operational Research, and the International Journal of
Physical Distribution and Logistics Management. His research interests include transportation policy
and productivity measurement.____________________

18

Journal of Transportation Management

